IPv6 Ready Logo

Phase-2 Test Specification IPsec

Technical Document

Revision 1.11.0

IPv6 Forum IPv6 Ready Logo Committee http://www.ipv6forum.org/ http://www.ipv6ready.org/



MODIFICATION RECORD

- Version 1.11.0 May 10, 2011
 - Added Section 5.3.6 to verify that End-Node can process a tunneled ICMPv6 Packet Too Big Message and correctly reassemble/fragment packet
 - Modified Section 5.1 End-Node Transport Mode Packet Too Big Reception to fragment inbound Echo Request.
 - Removed ESP Null Authentication Tests
 - Typos and bug fixes

Version 1.10.0

- May 31, 2010
 - Support Authentication Algorithm HMAC-SHA-256 in RFC 4868 (Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec) (Section 5.2.8, and 6.2.8)
- Added the description to Section 6.1.6 Possible Problems Version 1.9.2 February 03, 2010
 - Corrected pre-shared key at subsection 5.1.5
 - Corrected packet format of dummy packet at subsection 6.1.7
 - Clarified relationship between steps in procedure and judgment at all subsections.
- Version 1.9.1 January 07, 2009
 - Support the passive node which doesn't have ping6 application (as Possible Problems in Section 5.1.2)
- Version 1.9.0 December 09, 2008
 - Support RFC 4312 (The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec) (Section 5.2.7, 6.2.7)
- Use IPv6 prefix defined in RFC 3849 for the documentation Version 1.8.1 October 11, 2007
 - Remove ESN test cases (Section 5.1.12, 6.1.14)
- Version 1.8.0 April 27, 2007
 - Support IPsec v3
- Version 1.7.7 April 6, 2006
 - Correct 5.3.4 Category
- Version 1.7.6 December 22, 2005
 - Correct expected MTU value in ICMP Packet Too Big message for 6.1.5 Packet Too Big Forwarding.
- Version 1.7.5 September 20, 2005
 - Correct the maximum MTU value for 6.1.4 Packet Too Big Transmission.

Version 1.7.4 June 13, 2005

• Fix typos.



	FORUM
Version 1.7.3	June 7, 2005
	• Removed test for Packet Too Big Forwarding (Known Original
	Host) for SGW.
Version 1.7.2	April 20, 2005
	 Fix typos.
Version 1.7.1	April 18, 2005
	• Change Security Policy for 5.3.2.
Version 1.7	April 8, 2005
	 Add Sequence Number Increment Test.
	 Add ICMP Error Test.
Version 1.6	March 1, 2005
	• Change Keys
	 Add Select SPD test for tunnel mode
Version 1.5	November 26, 2004
	• Change packet description of 5.1.4
Version 1.4	November 19, 2004
	• Change Host to End-Node,
	• Default algorithms changed to (3DES-CBC, HMAC-SHA1) for
	Architecture test.
	• Editorial fix
Version 1.3	September 24, 2004
Version 1.2	September 22, 2004
Version 1.1	September 13, 2004
Version 1.0	September 8, 2004
	•



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

IPv6 Forum would like to acknowledge the efforts of the following organizations in the development of this test specification.

Principle Author:

• TAHI Project

Commentators:

- IRISA
- University of New Hampshire Interoperability Laboratory (UNH-IOL)



INTRODUCTION

The IPv6 forum plays a major role in bringing together industrial actors, to develop and deploy the next generation of IP protocols. Contrary to IPv4, which started with a small closed group of implementers, the universality of IPv6 leads to a huge number of implementations. Interoperability has always been considered as a critical feature in the Internet community.

Due to the large number of IPv6 implementations, it is important to provide the market a strong signal proving the level of interoperability across various products. To avoid confusion in the mind of customers, a globally unique logo program should be defined. The IPv6 logo will give confidence to users that IPv6 is currently operational. It will also be a clear indication that the technology will still be used in the future. To summarize, this logo program will contribute to the feeling that IPv6 is available and ready to be used.

The IPv6 Logo Program consists of three phases:

Phase 1:

In a first stage, the Logo will indicate that the product includes IPv6 mandatory core protocols and can interoperate with other IPv6 implementations.

Phase 2:

The "IPv6 ready" step implies a proper care, technical consensus and clear technical references. The IPv6 ready logo will indicate that a product has successfully satisfied strong requirements stated by the IPv6 Logo Committee (v6LC).

To avoid confusion, the logo "IPv6 Ready" will be generic. The v6LC will define the test profiles with associated requirements for specific functionalities.

Phase 3:

Same as Phase 2 with IPsec mandated.



REQUIREMENTS

To obtain the IPv6 Ready Logo Phase-2 for IPsec (IPsec Logo), the Node Under Test (NUT) must satisfy following requirements.

Equipment Type:

We define two possibilities for equipment types, they are as follows:

End-Node:

A node who can use IPsec only for itself. Host and Router can be an End-Node.

SGW (Security Gateway):

A node who can provide IPsec tunnel mode for nodes behind it. Router can be a SGW.

Security Protocol:

A NUT is required to pass all of the ESP tests regardless the equipment type. The IPv6 Ready Logo Program does not focus on AH.

Mode:

The mode requirement depends on the type of NUT.

End-Node:

If the NUT is an End-Node, it must pass all the Transport mode tests. If the NUT



supports the Tunnel mode, it also must pass all the Tunnel mode tests. (i.e., Tunnel mode is ADVANCED functionality for End-Node)

SGW:

If the NUT is a SGW, it must pass all the Tunnel mode tests.

Encryption Algorithm:

IPv6 Logo Committee had defined 2 encryption algorithm categories: BASE ALGORITHM and ADVANCED ALGORITHM. All NUTs must pass the BASE ALGORITHM tests to obtain an IPsec Logo. A NUT which supports algorithms listed as ADVANCED ALGORITHM, must pass all corresponding tests.

The algorithm requirement is independent from NUT type.

BASE ALGORITHM:

• 3DES-CBC

ADVANCED ALGORITHM:

- AES-CBC
- AES-CTR
- NULL
- CAMELLIA-CBC

Authentication Algorithm:

IPv6 Logo Committee had defined BASE ALGORITHM and ADVANCED ALGORITHM.

All NUTs have to pass all the test of BASE ALGORITHM to obtain the IPsec Logo.



The NUTs, which support the algorithms that are listed as ADVANCED ALGORITHM, have to pass all the corresponding tests.

The algorithm requirement is independent from NUT type.

BASE ALGORITHM:

• HMAC-SHA1

ADVANCED ALGORITHM:

- AES-XCBC-MAC-96
- NULL
- HMAC-SHA-256

Category:

All NUTs are required to support BASIC. ADVANCED is required for all NUTs which support ADVANCED encryption and/or authentication algorithms. Each test description contains a Category section which lists the requirements to satisfy the test.



REFERENCES

This test specification focus on the following IPsec related RFCs.

- [RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.
- [RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998.
- [RFC2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998.
- [RFC3566] Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 3566, September 2003.
- [RFC3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602, September 2003.
- [RFC3686] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 3686, January 2004.
- [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
- [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303, December 2005.
- [RFC4305] Eastlake, D., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4305, December 2005.
- [RFC4312] A. Kato, S. Moriai, and M. Kanda, "The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 4312, December 2005.
- [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006.
- [RFC4868] S. Kelly, and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC4868, May 2007.





TABLE OF CONTENTS

MC	MODIFICATION RECORD		
AC	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT		
IN	RODUC	ΓΙΟΝ	4
RE	QUIREM	ENTS	5
RE	FERENC	ES	
TA	BLE OF C	CONTENTS	10
1.	Test Deta	ails	13
2.	Test Top	ology	15
F	or End-N	ode: Transport and Tunnel Mode with End-Node Test	15
F	or End-N	ode: Tunnel Mode with SGW Test	16
F	for SGW:	Tunnel Mode with End-Node Test	17
F	for SGW:	Tunnel Mode Test	
3.	Descript	ion	
4.	Required	d Tests	
F	or End-N	ode:	
F	for SGW:		
5.	End-Noc	le Test	
5	.1. Arc	hitecture	
	5.1.1.	Select SPD	
	5.1.2.	Select SPD (ICMP Type)	
	5.1.3.	Sequence Number Increment	
	5.1.4.	Packet Too Big Reception	
	5.1.5.	Receipt of No Next Header	45
	5.1.6.	Bypass Policy	50
	5.1.7.	Discard Policy	55
	5.1.8.	Transport Mode Padding	60
	5.1.9.	Transport Mode TFC Padding	64
	5.1.10.	Non-Registered SPI	68



5.1.11.	ICV	
5.2. Alg	orithm Test	76
5.2.1.	Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1	77
5.2.2.	Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC	81
5.2.3.	Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL	85
5.2.4.	Transport Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	
5.2.5.	Transport Mode ESP= AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1	
5.2.6.	Transport Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1	
5.2.7.	Transport Mode ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SH	A1 98
5.2.8.	Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256	102
5.3. Tun	nel Mode	106
5.3.1.	Tunnel Mode with End-Node	106
5.3.2.	Tunnel Mode with SGW	110
5.3.3.	Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW	114
5.3.4.	Tunnel Mode Padding	120
5.3.5.	Tunnel Mode TFC Padding	125
5.3.6.	Tunnel Mode with SGW Fragmentation	129
6. SGW Te	st	141
6.1. Arc	hitecture	141
6.1.1.	Select SPD	142
6.1.2.	Select SPD (ICMP Type)	149
6.1.3.	Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW	156
6.1.4.	Sequence Number Increment	163
6.1.5.	Packet Too Big Transmission	167
6.1.6.	Packet Too Big Forwarding (Unknown Original Host)	172
6.1.7.	Receipt of No Next Header	178
6.1.8.	Bypass Policy	183
6.1.9.	Discard Policy	188
6.1.10.	Tunnel Mode Padding	193
6.1.11.	TFC Padding	198
6.1.12.	Non-Registered SPI	202



6.1.13.	ICV
6.1.14.	Tunnel Mode with End-Node
6.2. Alg	gorithm Test
6.2.1.	Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1
6.2.2.	Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC
6.2.3.	Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL
6.2.4.	Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1 224
6.2.5.	Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1
6.2.6.	Tunnel Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1
6.2.7.	Tunnel Mode ESP= CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1 236
6.2.8.	Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA256
Appendix-A	annex-5.1.2 for the passive node
1.1. usi	ng UDP application to invoke ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable (Port
unreachab	e)
1.2. inv	oking Neighbor Unreachability Detection



1. Test Details

This chapter contains detailed information, including terminology, which is described below.

Terminology:

TN : Tester NodeNUT : Node Under Test (Target Implementation)SGW : Security Gateway

Required Application:

All tests use ICMP Echo Request and Echo Reply messages by default. ICMP is independent from any implemented application and this adds clarity to the test. If the NUT can not apply IPsec for ICMPv6 packets, it is acceptable to use other protocols rather than ICMPv6. In this case, the device must support either ICMPv6, TCP or UDP. The application and port number are unspecified when TCP or UDP packets are used. The test coordinator should support any ports associated with an application used for the test. Applicants must mention the specific protocol and port that was used to execute the tests.

IPsec Configuration:

Manual key configuration is used by default and is a minimal requirement. IKE is an acceptable alternative to use when IPsec is tested. When IKE is used, the encryption key and authentication key are negotiated dynamically. In that case, dynamic keys are used rather than the static keys specified in this document.



The tester should support the alternative of using IKE with dynamic keys to execute the tests.

Topology:

In "2. Test Topology" the network topology for the test is shown.



2. Test Topology

These logical Network Topologies are used for test samples.

For End-Node: Transport and Tunnel Mode with End-Node Test

- 1. Set global address to NUT by RA (NUT_Link0)
- 2. Set MTU to NUT by RA (MTU value is 1500 for Link0)
- 3. Make IPsec transport mode between NUT and HOST1 and HOST2




Fig. 1 Topology for End-Node: Transport and Tunnel mode with End-Node



For End-Node: Tunnel Mode with SGW Test

- 1. Set global address to NUT by RA (NUT_Link0)
- 2. Set MTU to NUT by RA (MTU value is 1500 for Link0)
- 3. Make IPsec tunnel mode between NUT and SGW1.




Fig. 2 Topology for End-Node: Tunnel mode with SGW



For SGW: Tunnel Mode with End-Node Test

- 1. Set global address to NUT manually (NUT_Link0, NUT_Link1)
- 2. Set routing table to NUT manually (ROUTER1_Link1 for Link2)
- 3. Set MTU to NUT manually for Link0 and Link1 (MTU value is 1500 for Link0 and Link1)
- 4. Make IPsec tunnel mode between NUT and HOST2.




Fig. 3 Topology for SGW: Tunnel mode with End-Node



For SGW: Tunnel Mode Test

1. Set global address to NUT manually (NUT_Link0, NUT_Link1)

2. Set routing table to NUT manually (ROUTER1_Link1 for Link2, Link3 and Link4)

3. Set MTU to NUT manually for Link0 and Link1 (MTU value is 1500 for Link0 and Link1)

4. Make IPsec tunnel mode between NUT and SGW1 and SGW2




Fig. 4 Topology for SGW: Tunnel mode with SGW



3. Description

Each test specification consists of following parts.

Purpose:	The Purpose is the short statement describing what the test attempts to achieve. It is usually phrased as a simple assertion of the future or capability to be tested.
Category:	The Category shows what classification of device must satisfy the test.
References:	The References section contains some parts of specification related to the tests. It also shows the document names and section numbers.
Initialization:	The Initialization describes how to initialize and configure the NUT before starting each test. If a value is not provided, then the protocol's default value is used.
Packets:	The Packets describes the simple figure of packets which is used in the test. In this document, the packet name is represented in Italic style font.
Procedure:	The Procedure describes step-by-step instructions for carrying out the test.
Obser vable Results:	The Judgment describes expected result. If we can observe as same result as the description of Judgment, the NUT passes the test.
Possible Problems:	This section contains a description of known issues with the test procedure, which may affect test results in certain situations.



4. Required Tests

The following table lists which tests a device is required to pass based on category.



For End-Node:

Test Title	Category	Note
5.1.1 Select SPD	BASIC	
	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
5.1.2 Select SPD (ICMP Type)		Must be tested by ICMP
5.1.3 Sequence Number Increment	BASIC	
5.1.4 Packet Too Big Reception	BASIC	
5.1.5 Receipt of No Next Header	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
5.1.6 Bypass Policy	ADVANCED	Either of Bypass or Discard
5.1.7 Discard Policy	ADVANCED	Policy is required
5.1.8 Transport Mode Padding	BASIC	
E 1 0 Thomas at Made IFC Dadding	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
5.1.9 Transport Mode TFC Padding	ADVANGED	Must be tested by UDP
5.1.10 Non-Registered SPI	BASIC	
5. 1. 11 ICV	BASIC	
5.2.1 Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1	BASIC	
5.2.2 Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC	ADVANCED	
5.2.3 Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL	ADVANCED	
5.2.4 Transport Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
5.2.5 Transport Mode ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
5.2.6 Transport Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
5.2.7 Transport Mode ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit)	ADVANCED	
HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
5.2.8 Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256	ADVANCED	
5.3.1 Tunnel Mode with End-Node	ADVANCED	
5.3.2 Tunnel Mode with SGW	ADVANCED	
5.3.3 Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW	ADVANCED	
5.3.4 Tunnel Mode Padding	ADVANCED	
5.3.5 Tunnel Mode TFC Padding	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
5.3.6 Tunnel Mode with SGW Fragmentation	BASIC	



For SGW:

Test Title	Category	Note
6.1.1 Select SPD	BASIC	
6.1.2 Select SPD (ICMP Type)	ADVANCED	IPsec v3 Must be tested by ICMP
6.1.3 Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW	BASIC	
6.1.4 Sequence Number Increment	BASIC	
6.1.5 Packet Too Big Transmission	BASIC	
6.1.6 Packet Too Big Forwarding(Unknown Original Host)	BASIC	
6.1.7 Receipt of No Next Header	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
6.1.8 Bypass Policy	ADVANCED	Either of Bypass or Discard
6.1.9 Discard Policy	ADVANCED	Policy is required
6.1.10 Tunnel Mode Padding	BASIC	
6.1.11 Tunnel Mode TFC Padding	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
6.1.12 Non-Registered SPI	BASIC	
6. 1. 13 ICV	BASIC	
6.1.14 Tunnel Mode with End-Node	BASIC	
6.2.1 Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1	BASIC	
6. 2. 2 Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC	ADVANCED	
6.2.3 Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES=CBC NULL	ADVANCED	
6.2.4 Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
6.2.5 Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
6.2.6 Tunnel Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
6.2.7 Tunnel Mode ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
6.2.8 Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256	ADVANCED	



5. End-Node Test

This Chapter describes the test specification for End-Node.

The test specification consists of 2 sections. One is regarding "IPsec Architecture" and another part is regarding "Encryption and Authentication Algorithms".

5.1.Architecture

Scope:

Following tests focus on IPsec Architecture.

Overview:

Tests in this section verify that a node properly process and transmit based on the Security Policy Database and Security Association Database.



5.1.1. Select SPD

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) selects appropriate SPD (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		NUT
	>	SA1-I
	<	SA1-0
HOST2_Link1		NUT

-----> SA2-I <----- SA2-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1	-I
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0		
source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	HOST1_Link1	
upper spec	any	
direction	out	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I		
source address	HOST2_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x3000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02	

Security Policy Database (SPD) fo	r SA2-I
-----------------------------------	---------

source address	HOST2_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-0

NUT_LinkO
HOST2_Link1
0x4000
transport
ESP
3DES-CBC
ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
HMAC-SHA1
ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2	-0
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST2_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP

mode

transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo	Request	with	SA1's	ESP	
-----------	---------	------	-------	-----	--

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA1's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Request with SA2's ESP


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA2's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with SA1's ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. Host2 sends "ICMP Echo Request with SA2's ESP"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with SA1's ESP". Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with SA2's ESP".

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.2. Select SPD (ICMP Type)

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) selects appropriate SPD (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support IPsec v3) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		NUT
	>	SA1-I
	<	SA1-0
	>	SA2-I
	<	SA2-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1	-I
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

•	
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0		
source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	HOST1_Link1	
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request	
direction	out	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
SPI	0x3000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02	

source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-0

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x4000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security	Policy	Database	(SPD)	for	SA2-0	

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

I CMP	Fcho	Request	with	SA1-1's	ESP
1000	LUNU	πεγμεσι	WILII	UNI I O	LUI

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA2-O's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP


IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA2-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1	
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO	
ESP	SPI	0x3000	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2	
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)	



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. NUT sends "ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 5. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply with SA2-I's ESP"

Observable Results:

```
Part A:
  Step-2 (Judgment #1):
   NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with SA2-O's ESP".
  Step-4 (Judgment #2):
   NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP".
```

Possible Problems:

NUT may be a passive node which does not implement an application for sending Echo Requests. One of the following method to perform this test is required for the passive node.

- a) using UDP application to invoke ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable (Port unreachable) (see Appendix-A Section 1.1)
- b) invoking Neighbor Unreachability Detection (see Appendix-A Section 1.2)



5.1.3. Sequence Number Increment

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) increases sequence number correctly, starting with 1. (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		NUT
	>	SA-I
	<	SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

NUT_Link0
HOST1_Link1
0x2000
transport
ESP
3DES-CBC
ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
HMAC-SHA1
ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for	r SA-O
------------------------------------	--------

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport




IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence	$1^{st} = 1, 2^{nd} = 2$
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IOMI LOND NOPTY W		
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Sequence	$1^{st} = 1, 2^{nd} = 2$
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)





Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits an "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP" with an ESP Sequence Number of 1. Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits an "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP" with an ESP Sequence Number of 2.

Possible Problems:



5.1.4. Packet Too Big Reception

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can fragment and reassemble fragments correctly. (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1. Router1's interface to Link1 has an MTU value of 1280.

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

NUT_LinkO
HOST1_Link1
0x2000
transport
ESP
3DES-CBC
ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
HMAC-SHA1
ipv6readylogsha1out1
_

Security Policy Database (SPD) for	r SA-O
------------------------------------	--------

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1	
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0	
	Payload Length	1240	
Fragment Header	Offset	0	
	More	1	
ESP	SPI	0x1000	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)	

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2

TTUSMOTTOU ION EC	TO NEGUESE WITTI LOI Z		
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1	
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO	
	Payload Length	116	
Fragment Header	Offset	154	
	More	0	
ESP	SPI	0x1000	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	КЕҮ	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)	

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
	Payload Length	1340
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big)

IP Header	Source Address	Router_Link1	
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO	



ICMP	Туре	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1280
	Data	1232Byte of ICMP Echo Reply with
		ESP




Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1

TTuomerreed Ienni Et			
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0	
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1	
	Payload Length	1240	
Fragment	Offset	0	
	More Flag	1	
ESP	SPI	0x2000	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)	

Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0	
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1	
	Payload Length	116	
Fragment	Offset	154	
	More Flag	0	
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Reply with ESP	





Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request with ESP1 and 2"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. ROUTER1 sends "ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big)
- 4. HOST1 sends "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request with ESP1 and 2"
- 5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP" Step-5 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1" and "Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 2"

Possible Problems:



5.1.5. Receipt of No Next Header

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) process the dummy packet (the protocol value 59) correctly. (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support IPsec v3) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT -----> SA1-I <----- SA1-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I			
source address	HOST1_Link1		
destination address	NUT_Link0		
SPI	0x1000		
mode	transport		
protocol	ESP		
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC		
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01		
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1		
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01		

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1	-I
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1	-0
source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



I CMP	Fcho	Request	with	SA1-1's	ESP
1000	LUNU	πεγμεσι	WILII	UNI I O	LUI

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-O's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO	
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1	
ESP	SPI	0x2000	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)	

No Next Header with SA1-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1	
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO	
ESP	SPI	0x1000	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	
	Next Header	no next header (59)	
Upper Layer	Data	empty	



HOST1_Link1(TN)	Targ	get(NUT)
	 <	ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP
 <	 	<i>ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-0's ESP</i> (Judgment #1)
	>	No Next Header with SA1-I's ESP
 	 <	ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP
 < 	 	<i>ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-0's ESP</i> (Judgment #2)

Part A (ADVANCED): No Next Header w/o TFC Padding

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "No Next Header with SA1-O's ESP". The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 1
- 4. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP"*. The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 3
- 5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Part B (ADVANCED): No Next Header w/ TFC Padding

- 6. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP"
- 7. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 8. HOST1 sends "No Next Header with SA1-O's ESP". The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 6. The data in upper layer consists of random bytes as the plaintext portion.
- 9. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP"*. The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 8
- 10. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-0's ESP". Step-5 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-0's ESP". Part B: Step-7 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-0's ESP". Step-10 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-0's ESP".

Possible Problems:



5.1.6. Bypass Policy

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) select bypass or discard policies

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Bypass Policy, regardless of explicitly or implicitly) SGW : N/A

NOTE: NUT needs to pass at least either of "Bypass Policy" or "Discard Policy" tests.

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

NUT_Link0	
HOST1_Link1	
0x2000	
transport	
ESP	
3DES-CBC	
ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
HMAC-SHA1	
ipv6readylogsha1out1	
-	

Security Policy Database	(SPD)	for	SA-0
--------------------------	-------	-----	------

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Source Address	HOST1_Link1		
Destination Address	NUT_LinkO		
Payload Length	1460		
SPI	0x1000		
Algorithm	3DES-CBC		
KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01		
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1		
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01		
Туре	128 (Echo Request)		
	Source Address Destination Address Payload Length SPI Algorithm KEY Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key		

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO	
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1	
	Payload Length	1460	
ESP	SPI	0x2000	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)	


ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)





Part A (ADVANCED -- except Either of Bypass or Discard Policy is required):

- 1. Set Bypass policy for above ICMP Echo Request to NUT as following example
- 2. Host1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 3. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 4. HOST2 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
- 5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Example 1: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=Bypass

source address	HOST2_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
policy	bypass (none)	

Example 2: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=Bypass as default policy

source address	any
destination address	any
upper spec	any
direction	in
policy	bypass (none)



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP" Step-5 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply"

Possible Problems:



5.1.7. Discard Policy

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) select bypass or discard policies

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Discard Policy, regardless of explicitly or implicitly) SGW : N/A

NOTE: NUT need to pass at least either of "Bypass Policy" or "Discard Policy" tests.

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		NUT
	>	SA-I
	<	SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

······································		
NUT_LinkO		
HOST1_Link1		
0x2000		
transport		
ESP		
3DES-CBC		
ipv6readylogo3descbcout1		
HMAC-SHA1		
ipv6readylogsha1out1		

Security Policy Database (SP	'D) for	SA-0
------------------------------	---------	------

source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	HOST1_Link1	
upper spec	any	
direction	out	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	



Source Address	HOST1_Link1	
Destination Address	NUT_LinkO	
Payload Length	1460	
SPI	0x1000	
Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	
Туре	128 (Echo Request)	
	Source Address Destination Address Payload Length SPI Algorithm KEY Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key	

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
	Payload Length	1460
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)







Part A (ADVANCED -- except Either of Bypass or Discard Policy is required):

- 1. Set Discard policy for above ICMP Echo Request to NUT as following example
- 2. Host1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 3. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 4. HOST2 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
- 5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
upper spec	any
direction	in
policy	discard

Example 2: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=Discard as default policy

source address	any
destination address	any
upper spec	any
direction	in
policy	discard



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP" Step-5 (Judgment #2): NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:



5.1.8. Transport Mode Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) supports padding & padding byte handling (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		NUT
	>	SA-I
	<	SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



IP Header Source Address		HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	Sequential
	Padding Length	7
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2


IP Header Source Address		HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	Sequential
	Padding Length	255
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
	Padding Length	7+8n (0 <= n <= 31)
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Data Length	7

IPsec





Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"

Possible Problems:



5.1.9. Transport Mode TFC Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) supports TFC Padding (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support IPsec v3) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		
	>	SA1-I
	<	SA1-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0		
source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	HOST1_Link1	
upper spec	any	
direction	out	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	



UDP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP * TFC Padded

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
UDP	Source Port	10000
	Destination Port	7 (echo)

UDP Echo Reply with SA1-O's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
UDP	Source Port	7 (echo)
	Destination Port	10000



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. HOST1 sends "UDP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP * TFC Padded"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "UDP Echo Reply with SA1-0's ESP".

Possible Problems:



5.1.10. Non-Registered SPI

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can behave when No valid Security Association is configured.

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		
	>	SA-I
	<	SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-	I
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	HOST1_Link1	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)


ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2 with non-registered SPI

Town Eono Request with Eon 2 with non registered of I			
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1	
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0	
ESP	SPI	0x9000 (Different from SA-I's	
		SPD)	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)	

ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)





Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2"*(different SPI)
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:



5.1.11. ICV

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can detect the modification by examining the ICV (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		NUT
	>	SA-I
	<	SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

······································		
NUT_LinkO		
HOST1_Link1		
0x2000		
transport		
ESP		
3DES-CBC		
ipv6readylogo3descbcout1		
HMAC-SHA1		
ipv6readylogsha1out1		

Security Policy Database (SP	'D) for	SA-0
------------------------------	---------	------

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"EchoData"

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Data	"EchoData"

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2


Ionn Eone negacer		
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence number	2
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	ICV	aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"cracked"

ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2" (ICV is modified)
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:



5.2. Algorithm Test

Scope:

Following tests focus on Encryption and Authentication Algorithms.

Overview:

Tests in this section verify that the NUT properly decrypt the received packet s and encrypts the transmitting packets using Encryption algorithms specified in the SAD.

And they verify that the NUT properly processes the authentication algorithms specified in the SAD.



5.2.1. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

NUT_LinkO HOST1_Link1
0.0000
0x2000
transport
ESP
3DES-CBC
ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
HMAC-SHA1
ipv6readylogsha1out1
E 3 F

Security Policy Database (SP	'D) for	SA-0
------------------------------	---------	------

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport




IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	КЕҮ	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Possible Problems:





5.2.2. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support AES-XCBC as an authentication algorithm)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2451]
- [RFC3566]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		NUT
	>	SA-I
	<	SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	AES-XCBC-MAC-96	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readaesxin01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	AES-XCBC-MAC-96
ESP authentication key	ipv6readaesxout1

Security Policy Database (SF	PD) for	SA-0
------------------------------	---------	------

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport




IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC-MAC-96
	Authentication Key	ipv6readaesxin01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	КЕҮ	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC-MAC-96
	Authentication Key	ipv6readaesxout1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED)

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"

Possible Problems:





5.2.3. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC NULL

Removed at revision 1.11.0.



5.2.4. Transport Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support AES-CBC (128-bit) as an encryption algorithm) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC3602]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		NUT
	>	SA-I
	<	SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readaescin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link0	
destination address	HOST1_Link1	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readaescout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport




IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
	Кеу	ipv6readaescin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0	
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1	
ESP	SPI	0x2000	
	Algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)	
	Кеу	ipv6readaescout1	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)	

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"

Possible Problems:





5.2.5. Transport Mode ESP= AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP= AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support AES-CTR as an encryption algorithm) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC3686]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	AES-CTR	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogaescin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	HOST1_Link1	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	AES-CTR	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogaescout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database ((SPD)	for	SA-0
----------------------------	-------	-----	------

source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	HOST1_Link1	
upper spec	any	
direction	out	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	




IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	AES-CTR
	Кеу	ipv6readylogaescin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	AES-CTR
	Кеу	ipv6readylogaescout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"

Possible Problems:





5.2.6. Transport Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support NULL as an encryption algorithm) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2410]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1		NUT
	>	SA-I
	<	SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	NULL	
ESP algorithm key		
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	NULL
ESP algorithm key	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
	•

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport




IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	NULL
	Кеу	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	NULL
	Кеу	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"

Possible Problems:





5.2.7. Transport Mode ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) as an encryption algorithm)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4312]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1 ------ NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0

98



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	HOST1_Link1
Destination address	NUT_LinkO
SPI	0x1000
Mode	transport
Protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)
ESP algorithm key	ipvcamelliacin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
upper spec	Any
direction	In
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	HOST1_Link1	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	transport	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)	
ESP algorithm key	ipvcamelliacout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	Any
direction	Out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport




IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)
	Кеу	ipvcamelliacin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)
	Кеу	ipvcamelliacout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"

Possible Problems:





5.2.8. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]
- [RFC4868]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA-256
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	Any
direction	In
protocol	ESP
mode	Transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

-
NUT_Link0
HOST1_Link1
0x2000
Transport
ESP
3DES-CBC
ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
HMAC-SHA-256
ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport




IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA-256
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256in01
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

Source Address	NUT_LinkO
Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
Algorithm	3DES-CBC
KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA-256
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256out1
Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Destination Address SPI Algorithm KEY Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key

Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"

Possible Problems:





5.3. Tunnel Mode

5.3.1. Tunnel Mode with End-Node

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can build IPsec tunnel mode with End-Node correctly. (End-Node tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Tunnel Mode) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
tunnel source address	HOST1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_LinkO
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_LinkO
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_LinkO
tunnel destination address	HOST1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

Source Address	NUT_LinkO			
Destination Address	HOST1_Link1			
SPI	0x2000			
Algorithm	3DES-CBC			
Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1			
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1			
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1			
Source Address	NUT_LinkO			
Destination Address	HOST1_Link1			
Туре	129 (Echo Reply)			
	Destination Address SPI Algorithm Key Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key Source Address Destination Address			



Procedure:

HOST1_Link1(TN) Target(NUT) | | | |------>| ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel | | | <------| ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel | | | | |

Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP tunnel"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits the packet "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel".

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.2. Tunnel Mode with SGW

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can build IPsec tunnel mode with SGW correctly (End-Node tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Tunnel Mode) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1	
tunnel destination address	NUT_LinkO	
source address	Link2	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	SGW1_Link1	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_LinkO
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

Source Address	NUT_LinkO
Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
Algorithm	3DES-CBC
Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
Source Address	NUT_LinkO
Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Source Address Destination Address SPI Algorithm Key Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key Source Address Destination Address



Procedure:

Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits the packet "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel".

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.3. Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can build IPsec tunnel mode with SGW correctly (End-Node tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Tunnel Mode) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1_Link2 -	SG	N1		NUT_LinkO
			>	SA1-I
			<	SA1-0

HOST2_Link2 -- SGW1 ------ NUT_Link0 -----> SA2-I <----- SA2-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I		
source address	SGW1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I		
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1	
tunnel destination address	NUT_LinkO	
source address	HOST1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	SGW1_Link1	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_LinkO
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I		
source address	SGW1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_Link0	
SPI	0x3000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-I	
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_LinkO
source address	HOST2_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-0

source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	SGW1_Link1	
SPI	0x4000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-0

tunnel source address	NUT_LinkO	
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1	
source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	HOST2_Link2	
upper spec	any	
direction	out	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST1 within ESP tunnel

Source Address	NUT_LinkO
Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
Algorithm	3DES-CBC
Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
Source Address	NUT_LinkO
Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Source Address Destination Address SPI Algorithm Key Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key Source Address Destination Address



ICMP Echo Request from HOST2 within ESP tunnel


IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2 within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link2
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request from HOST2 within ESP tunnel"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits the packet "ICMP Echo Reply to HOST1 within ESP tunnel". Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits the packet "ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2 within ESP tunnel".

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.4. Tunnel Mode Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) supports padding & padding byte handling (End-Node Tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Tunnel Mode) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_LinkO
source address	Link2
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	sequential
	Padding Length	7
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel 1

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel 2


,		
IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	sequential
	Padding Length	255
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7



ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

Iom Eone nopry un		1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
	Padding Length	7+8n (0 <= n <= 31)
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Data Length	7

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits the packet "ICMP Echo Reply to HOST1 within ESP tunnel". Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits the packet "ICMP Echo Reply to HOST1 within ESP tunnel".

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.5. Tunnel Mode TFC Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) supports TFC Padding (End-Node tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Tunnel Mode and IPsec v3) SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_LinkO
source address	Link2
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_LinkO
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_LinkO
destination address	Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel * TFC Padded

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

Source Address	NUT_LinkO
Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
Algorithm	3DES-CBC
Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
Source Address	NUT_LinkO
Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Source Address Destination Address SPI Algorithm Key Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key Source Address Destination Address



Procedure:

Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel * TFC Padded"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits the packet "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel".

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.6. Tunnel Mode with SGW Fragmentation

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT can reassemble/fragment packets correctly inside ESP Tunnel

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Tunnel Mode and IPsec v3)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2 MTU value is 1280 for Link2.

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST1 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link1	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1	
tunnel destination address	NUT_LinkO	
source address	Link2	
destination address	NUT_LinkO	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_LinkO	
destination address	SGW1_Link1	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link0	
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1	
source address	NUT_Link0	
destination address	Link2	
upper spec	any	
direction	out	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	



Packets:

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request A within ESP tunnel

ICMP Echo Request A

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply A

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply A within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B to NUT2 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1 Link2
II Houdon		
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	<i>1stPL</i> (=MTU-40) (e.g., 1240)
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B to Host2 2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
	Payload Length	<i>2ndPL</i> (=1476-1stPL)
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request



Tragmented Tom Lene Neguest D to nostz within Lon T		
IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
	Payload Length	1stPL
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B to Host2 within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	2ndPL
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request

ICMP Echo Reply B within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMP Echo Reply B

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP	Packet	Τοο	Rig	within	FSP
1000	TAUNUL	100	DIS		LUI

1000 100000		
IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_LINK2
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1280 <= n <= 1430 (e.g., 1280)
	Data	1232Byte of ICMP Echo Reply B



Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C to NUT2 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2	
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO	
	Payload Length	<i>1stPL</i> (=MTU-40) (e.g., 1240)	
Fragment	Offset	0	
	More Flag	1	
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)	

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C to Host2 2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2	
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0	
	Payload Length	<i>2ndPL</i> (=1476-1stPL)	
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8	
	More Flag	0	
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request	



Fragmented	ICMP	Echo	Request	С	to	Host2	within	ESP	1
------------	------	------	---------	---	----	-------	--------	-----	---

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1		
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO		
ESP	SPI	0x2000		
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC		
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1		
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1		
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1		
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2		
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO		
	Payload Length	1stPL		
Fragment	Offset	0		
	More Flag	1		
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)		

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C to Host2 within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1		
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO		
ESP	SPI	0x2000		
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC		
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1		
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1		
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1		
IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2		
	Destination Address	NUT_LinkO		
	Payload Length	2ndPL		
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8		
	More Flag	0		
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request		



Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C to NUT2 1

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
	Payload Length	<i>1stPL</i> (=MTU-40) (e.g., 1240)
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C to Host2 2

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0	
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2	
	Payload Length	<i>2ndPL</i> (=1476-1stPL)	
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8	
	More Flag	0	
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Reply	



Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C to Host2 within ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0		
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1		
ESP	SPI	0x2000		
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC		
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1		
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1		
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1		
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO		
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2		
	Payload Length	1stPL		
Fragment	Offset	0		
	More Flag	1		
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)		

Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C to Host2 within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO		
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1		
ESP	SPI	0x2000		
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC		
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1		
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1		
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1		
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO		
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2		
	Payload Length	2ndPL		
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8		
	More Flag	0		
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Reply		



Procedure:

Target(NUT) SGW1_	Link1(TN) HOST [*]	1_Link2(TN)
 <> > 	 	<pre>I ICMP Echo Request A (size < 1000 bytes) I (SRC=HOST1_Link2/DST=NUT_Link0) ICMP Echo Request A within ESP ICMP Echo Reply A within ESP (Judgment #1) ICMP Echo Reply (SRC=NUT_Link0/DST=HOST1_Link2)</pre>
 < 	 < < 	<pre>Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B #1 (SRC=HOST1_Link2/DST=NUT_Link0) Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B #2 (SRC=HOST1_Link2/DST=NUT_Link0) Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B #1 within ESP Fragmented CMP Echo Request B #2 within ESP</pre>
 > <	 	 <i>ICMP Echo Reply B within ESP</i> (Judgment #2) <i>ICMP Packet Too Big within ESP</i>
 < <	 < < 	<pre>Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C #1 (SRC=HOST1_Link2/DST=NUT_Link0) Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C #2 (SRC=HOST1_Link2/DST=NUT_Link0) Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C #1 within ESP Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C #2 within ESP</pre>
 > 	 	Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C #1 within ESP (Judgment #3) Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C #2 within ESP
	 > >	<pre>(Judgment #3) Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C #1 (SRC=NUT_Link0/DST=HOST1_Link2) Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C #2 (SRC=NUT_Link0/DST=HOST1_Link2)</pre>

IPv6 FORUM TECHNICAL DOCUMENT



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. SGW1 sends ICMPv6 Echo Request from Host1 to NUT within ESP
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. SGW1 sends ICMPv6 Echo Request fragments totaling 1500 Bytes from Host1 to NUT within ESP Tunnel
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 5. SGW1 sends ICMPv6 Packet Too Big Message within ESP Tunnel to NUT
- 6. SGW1 sends ICMPv6 Echo Request fragments totaling 1500 Bytes from Host1 to NUT within ESP Tunnel
- 7. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A∶

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits ICMPv6 Echo Reply from NUT to Host1 within ESP Tunnel Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT reassembles ICMPv6 Echo Request and transmits fully assembled ICMPv6 Echo Reply from NUT to Host1 within ESP Tunnel

Step-7 (Judgment #3):

NUT reassembles ICMPv6 Echo Request and transmits fragmented ICMPv6 Echo Reply from NUT to Host1 within ESP Tunnel

Possible Problems:

None.



6. SGW Test

This Chapter describes the test specification for SGW. The test specification consists of 2 parts. One is regarding "IPsec Architecture" and another part is regarding to "Encryption and Authentication Algorithms".

6.1.Architecture

Scope:

Following tests focus on IPsec Architecture.

Overview:

Tests in this section verify that a node properly process and transmit based on the Security Policy Database and Security Association Database.



6.1.1. Select SPD

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) selects appropriate SPD (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 SGW1		NUT HOST1_LinkO
	>	SA1-I
	<	SA1-0
HOST4_Link4 SGW2		NUT HOST1_LinkO
	>	SA2-I
	<	SA2-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I		
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I	
source address	SGW2_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x3000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-I	
tunnel source address	SGW2_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link4
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-0

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW2_Link2	
SPI	0x4000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW2_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link4
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo	Romunst	within	\$41' c	FSP
I GIMP ECITO	Request	WILIIII	SAIS	ЕЗГ

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA1's ESP

Ionn Lone Ropij n		
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMP Echo Request within SA2's ESP

IOMI LONG NEGUEDE		
IP Header	Source Address	SGW2_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
IP Header	Source Address	HOST4_Link4
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST4

IP Header	Source Address	HOST4_Link4
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST4


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST4_Link4
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA2's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW2_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST4_Link4
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within SA1's ESP"* (originally from HOST2)
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 5. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within SA2's ESP" (originally from HOST4)
- 6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 7. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply to HOST4"
- 8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request from HOST2" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within SA1's ESP" Step-6 (Judgment #3): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request from HOST4" Step-8 (Judgment #4): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within SA2's ESP"

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.2. Select SPD (ICMP Type)

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) selects appropriate SPD (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support IPsec v3)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 SGW1		NUT HOST1_Link0
	>	SA1-I
	<	SA1-0
	>	SA2-I
	<	SA2-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I		
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1	
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2	
source address	Link0	
destination address	Link3	
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request	
direction	out	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x3000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2	-1
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-0

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x4000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA2-O's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMP Echo Request to HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Rquest)

ICMP Echo Request within SA1-O's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA2-I's ESP


IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP"* (originally from HOST2)
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 5. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request to HOST2"
- 6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 7. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply within SA2-I's ESP"* (originally from HOST2)
- 8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request from HOST2" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within SA2-O's ESP" Step-6 (Judgment #3): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request within SA1-O's ESP" Step-8 (Judgment #4): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply from HOST2"

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.3. Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) selects appropriate SPD (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 SGW1		NUT HOST1_LinkO
	>	SA1-I
	<	SA1-0
HOST3_Link3 SGW1		NUT HOST1_LinkO
	>	SA2-I
	<	SA2-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I	
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	HOST2_Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	HOST2_Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x3000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-I		
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	HOST3_Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x4000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	HOST3_Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo	Romunst	within	\$41' c	FSP
I GIMP ECITO	Request	WILIIII	SAIS	ЕЗГ

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2

	III COTE	
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA1's ESP

Ionn Lone Ropij n		
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMP Echo Request within SA2's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
IP Header	Source Address	HOST3_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST3

IP Header	Source Address	HOST3_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST3


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST3_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA2's ESP

Iom Lone Ropij II		
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST3_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within SA1's ESP"* (originally from HOST2)
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 5. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within SA2's ESP"* (originally from HOST3)
- 6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 7. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply to HOST3"
- 8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request from HOST2" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within SA1's ESP" Step-6 (Judgment #3): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request from HOST3" Step-8 (Judgment #4): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within SA2's ESP"

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.4. Sequence Number Increment

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) increases sequence number correctly, starting with 1. (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

Iom Eone negacee	1	1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Sequence	$1^{st} = 1, 2^{nd} = 2$
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits an "ICMP Echo Request within ESP" with an ESP Sequence number of 1 Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits an "ICMP Echo Request within ESP" with an ESP Sequence number of 2

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.5. Packet Too Big Transmission

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) transmits the ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big) correctly. (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-O

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1460
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big)

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1280 <= n <= 1430 (e.g., 1280)
	Data	1232Byte of ICMP Echo Request

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request to Host2 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0		
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3		
	Payload Length	<i>1stPL</i> (=MTU-40) (e.g., 1240)		
Fragment	Offset	0		
	More Flag	1		
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)		

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request to Host2 2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0		
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3		
	Payload Length	<i>2ndPL</i> (=1476-1stPL)		
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8		
	More Flag	0		
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request		



Fragmented	ICMP	Echo	Reauest	to	Host2	within	ESP	1
1 1 40.000		20110	110940000		110002		207	


IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1	
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2	
ESP	SPI	0x2000	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0	
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3	
	Payload Length	1stPL	
Fragment	Offset	0	
	More Flag	1	
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)	

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request to Host2 within ESP 2

IP Header Source Address		NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	2ndPL
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request to HOST2 1" and "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request to HOST2 2"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big)" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1" and "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2"

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.6. Packet Too Big Forwarding (Unknown Original Host)

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) forwards the ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big) correctly when NUT can not determine the original host. (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4. Router1's interface to Link2 has an MTU value of 1356.

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1360
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Error Message to NUT (Packet Too Big)

IP Header	Source Address	ROUTER1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ICMP	Туре	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1356
	Data	1232Byte of ICMP Echo Request

ICMP Error Message to HOST1 (Packet Too Big)

IP Header	Source Address	ROUTER1_Link2 or NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1280 - 1286
	Data	1232Byte of ICMP Echo Request

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 1

	-	
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1240
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 2

0			
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0	
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3	
	Payload Length	136	
Fragment	Offset	154	
	More Flag	0	
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request	



ICMP	Echo	Request	within	ESP
------	------	---------	--------	-----

Source Address	NUT_Link1
Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
Algorithm	3DES-CBC
Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
Source Address	HOST1_Link0
Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
Payload Length	1360
Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Source Address Destination Address SPI Algorithm Key Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key Source Address Destination Address Payload Length

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1240
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2

IP Header Source Address		NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	136
Fragment	Offset	154
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request



Procedure:

SGW1_Link2(TN)	ROUTER1_Link2(TN)	Target(NUT)	HOST1_LinkO(TN)
 <	 	 < 	 ICMP Echo Request ICMP Echo Request to HOST2 within ESP (Judgment #1)
	 	> 	 ICMP Error Message to NUT (Packet Too Big)
		 	ICMP Echo Request > ICMP Error Message to HOST1 (Packet Too Big) (Judgment #2)
		 < <	Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 1 Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 2
 < 	 	 	 Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1 Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2 (Judgment #3)

Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. ROUTER1 sends "ICMP Error Message to NUT (Packet Too Big)"
- 4. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
- 5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 6. HOST1 sends "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 1" and "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 2"
- 7. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):
 NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
Step-5 (Judgment #2):
 NUT transmits "ICMP Error Message to HOST1 (Packet Too Big)"
Step-7 (Judgment #3):
 NUT transmits "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1" and "Fragmented
 ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2"

Possible Problems:

The NUT (SGW) may choose to process the ICMPv6 Packet Too Big PMTU information on the ciphertext side of the interface. In this case, the NUT will not generate and send a Packet Too Big Message to Host1, but will instead fragment IPv6 Packets from Host1 after tunneling and applying ESP. Host1 will continue to transmit whole packets. See RFC 4301 Section 6.1.



6.1.7. Receipt of No Next Header

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) process the dummy packet (the protocol value 59) correctly. (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support IPsec v3)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------> SA1-I <----- SA1-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I		
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



	F - /	D	! + . !	CAT I' - FOD	
IGMP	ECNO	Kequest	WITNIN	SA1-I's ESP	

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2


IP Header Source Address		HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

No Next Header within SA1-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Next Header	no next header (59)
Upper Layer	Data	empty



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED): No Next Header w/o TFC Padding

- 1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP"* (originally from HOST2)
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. SGW1 sends *"No Next Header within SA1-I's ESP"* (originally from HOST2). The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 1
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP" (originally from HOST2). The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 3
- 6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Part B (ADVANCED): No Next Header w/ TFC Padding

- 7. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP"* (originally from HOST2)
- 8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 9. SGW1 sends "No Next Header within SA1-I's ESP" (originally from HOST2). The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 7. The data in upper layer consists of random bytes as the plaintext portion.
- 10. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 11. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP" (originally from HOST2). The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 9
- 12. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"* Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT does not transmit any packets. Step-6 (Judgment #3): NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"* Part B: Step-8 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"* Step-10 (Judgment #2): NUT does not transmit any packets. Step-12 (Judgment #3): NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"*

Possible Problems:



6.1.8. Bypass Policy

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) select bypass or discard policies

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support Bypass Policy, regardless of explicitly or implicitly)

NOTE: NUT need to pass at least either of "Bypass Policy" or "Discard Policy" tests.

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-	I
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP


ICMP Echo Request from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST4

IP Header	Source Address	HOST4_Link4
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)





- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Procedure:

direction

- 3. Set Bypass Policy for above ICMP Echo Reply to NUT as following example
- 4. SGW2 forwards "ICMP Echo Request from HOST4"
- 5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Example 1: Security Policy Database (S	PD) for policy=bypass (none)
source address	HOST4_Link4
destination address	HOST1_Link0
upper spec	any

policy	bypass (none)	
Example 2: Security Policy Datab policy	pase (SPD) for policy=bypass (no	ne) as default

out

source address	any
destination address	any
upper spec	any
direction	out
policy	bypass (none)



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" on Link0 Step-5 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request from HOST4" on Link0

Possible Problems:



6.1.9. Discard Policy

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) select bypass or discard policies

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : ADVAN

GW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support Discard Policy, regardless of explicitly or implicitly)

NOTE: NUT need to pass at least either of "Bypass Policy" or "Discard Policy" tests.

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST4

IP Header	Source Address	HOST4_Link4
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED -- except Either of Bypass or Discard Policy is required):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. Set discard policy for above ICMP Echo Reply to NUT as following example
- 4. HOST4 sends "ICMP Echo Request from HOST4"
- 5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

source address	HOST4_Link4
destination address	HOST1_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	out
policy	discard

Example 2: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=discard as default policy

source address	any
destination address	any
upper spec	any
direction	out
policy	discard



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" on Link0. Step-5 (Judgment #2): NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:



6.1.10. Tunnel Mode Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) supports padding & padding byte handling (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
Tunnel destination address	HOST1_Link1
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	Sequential
	Padding Length	7+8n (0 <= n <= 31)
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

ICMP Echo Request

Iem Lene negatet		
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
	Padding	Sequential
	Padding Length	7+8n (0 <= n <= 31)
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Data Length	7



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP" (Padding Length=7)
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 5. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP" (Padding Length=255)
- 6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 7. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP" Step-6 (Judgment #3): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-8 (Judgment #4): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"

Possible Problems:



6.1.11. TFC Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) supports TFC Padding (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support IPsec v3)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------> SA1-I <----- SA1-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I	
tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel




	F - /	D		011 1'-		TEO Daddad
IUMP	ECNO	Request	WILNIN	SAI-I S	ESP *	TFC Padded

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
II Headel		
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP * TFC Padded"* (originally from HOST2)
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"*

Possible Problems:





6.1.12. Non-Registered SPI

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) can behave when No valid Security Association is configured.

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

cooliney house and bacabaco (onb) not on o		
source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2 with non-registered SPI

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	Ox9000 (different from SA-I's SPD)
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:



6.1.13. ICV

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) can detect the modification by examining the ICV (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 -----> SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"PadLen is zero"

ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1

ICMP Echo Request


I em Eene Requeet		
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"PadLen is zero"

ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence number	2
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
	ICV	aaaaaaaa
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"cracked"



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2" (with INCORRECT ICV)
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:



6.1.14. Tunnel Mode with End-Node

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) can build IPsec tunnel mode with End-Node correctly, $\ensuremath{\mathsf{ESP}}\xspace=3\ensuremath{\mathsf{DESP}}\xspace$

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.3

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2		NUT	HOST1
	>	SA-I	
	<	SA-0	



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	HOST2_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
tunnel source address	HOST2_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	HOST2_Link2
destination address	HOST1_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

booth rey hobboration bacabaco (onb) for on o		
source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	HOST2_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	HOST2_Link2
source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	HOST2_Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



ICMP Echo Request	within L	ESP tunnel
-------------------	----------	------------

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link2
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link2
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link2
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1	
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link2	
ESP	SPI	0x2000	
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC	
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0	
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link2	
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)	



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

- 1. HOST2 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"

Possible Problems:



6.2. Algorithm Test

Scope:

Following tests focus on Encryption and Authentication Algorithms.

Overview:

Tests in this section verify that the NUT properly decrypt the received packet s and encrypts the transmitting packets using Encryption algorithms specified in the SAD.

And they verify that the NUT properly processes the authentication algorithms specified in the SAD.



6.2.1. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------ SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)


ICMP Echo Reply

2 c = c c p . j		
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)





Part A (BASIC):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"

Possible Problems:



6.2.2. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support AES-XCBC as an authentication algorithm)

References:

- [RFC2451]
- [RFC3566]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------ SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	AES-XCBC
ESP authentication key	ipv6readaesxin01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	AES-XCBC
ESP authentication key	ipv6readaesxout1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC
	Authentication Key	ipv6readaesxin01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)


ICMP Echo Reply

2 c = c c p . j		
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

Source Address	NUT_Link1
Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
Algorithm	3DES-CBC
Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC
Authentication Key	ipv6readaesxout1
Source Address	HOST1_Link0
Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Source Address Destination Address SPI Algorithm Key Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key Source Address Destination Address





Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"

Possible Problems:



6.2.3. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC NULL

Removed at revision 1.11.0.



6.2.4. Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support AES-CBC (128-bit) as an encryption algorithm)

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC3602]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------ SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)	
ESP key	ipv6readaescin01	
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

country househalten balabase (onb) for on o		
source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)	
ESP key	ipv6readaescout1	
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
	Кеу	ipv6readaescin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)


ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
	Кеу	ipv6readaescout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)





Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"

Possible Problems:



6.2.5. Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1

Category:

 $\mathsf{End}\text{-}\mathsf{Node}\ \vdots\ \mathsf{N}/\mathsf{A}$

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support AES-CTR as an encryption algorithm)

References:

- [RFC3686]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------ SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CTR
ESP key	ipv6readylogaescin01
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CTR
ESP key	ipv6readylogaescout1
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	AES-CTR
	Кеу	ipv6readylogaescin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)


ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	AES-CTR
	Кеу	ipv6readylogaescout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)





Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"

Possible Problems:



6.2.6. Tunnel Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1

Category:

 $\mathsf{End}\text{-}\mathsf{Node}\ \vdots\ \mathsf{N}/\mathsf{A}$

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support NULL as an encryption algorithm)

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2410]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------ SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I	
source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	NULL
ESP key	
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	NULL
ESP key	
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	NULL
	Кеу	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)


ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

Source Address	NUT_Link1
Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
Algorithm	NULL
Кеу	
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
Source Address	HOST1_Link0
Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Source Address Destination Address SPI Algorithm Key Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key Source Address Destination Address





Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"

Possible Problems:



6.2.7. Tunnel Mode ESP= CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP= CAMELLIA-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : N/A SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) as an encryption algorithm)

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4312]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------ SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)	
ESP key	ipvcamelliacin01	
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I		
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2	
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1	
source address	Link3	
destination address	Link0	
upper spec	any	
direction	in	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

cooline graduation bucubuod (chb) non on o		
source address	NUT_Link1	
destination address	SGW1_Link2	
SPI	0x2000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)	
ESP key	ipvcamelliacout1	
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1	
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2	
source address	Link0	
destination address	Link3	
upper spec	any	
direction	out	
protocol	ESP	
mode	tunnel	



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)
	Кеу	ipvcamelliacin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)


ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_LinkO
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)
	Кеу	ipvcamelliacout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)





Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 3. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"

Possible Problems:



6.2.8. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA256

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA256

Category:

 $\mathsf{End}\text{-}\mathsf{Node}\ :\ \mathsf{N}/\mathsf{A}$

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support HMAC-SHA-256 as an authentication algorithm)

References:

- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]
- [RFC4868]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ------ NUT -- HOST1_Link0 ------ SA-I <----- SA-0



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I		
source address	SGW1_Link2	
destination address	NUT_Link1	
SPI	0x1000	
mode	tunnel	
protocol	ESP	
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC	
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA-256	
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256in01	

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I	
Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-O

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA-256
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_LinkO
ICMP	Туре	128 (Echo Request)


ICMP Echo Reply

2 c = c c p . j		
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

Iom Lone Ropij w		
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Кеу	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)





Part A (ADVANCED):

- 5. SGW1 sends "ICMP Echo Request within ESP"
- 6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
- 7. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Reply"
- 8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A: Step-2 (Judgment #1): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Request" Step-4 (Judgment #2): NUT transmits "ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"

Possible Problems:



Appendix-A annex-5.1.2 for the passive node

This appendix describes alternative methods to perform Test 5.1.2 on the passive node which doesn't have the application to send ICMPv6 Echo Request.



1.1. using UDP application to invoke ICMPv6 Destination

Unreachable (Port unreachable)

Requirements:

- Must respond to ICMPv6 Echo Request with ICMPv6 Echo Reply
- Must respond to UDP packet toward the closed port with ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable (Port unreachable)

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

(passive node) HOST1 ----- transport ----- NUT ------ spi=0x1000 -----> SA1-I ICMPv6 Echo Request <----- spi=0x2000 ------ SA2-0 ICMPv6 Echo Reply <----- spi=0x3000 ------ SA3-0 ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable (Port unreachable)



• SA1-I

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request
direction	inbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

• SA2-O

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	outbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



• SA3-O

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x3000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout3
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out3

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable
direction	outbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



ICMPv6 Echo Request with ESP1

IPv6	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMPv6	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMPv6 Echo Reply with ESP2

Source Address	NUT_Link0
Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
Algorithm	3DES-CBC
KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
Туре	129 (Echo Reply)
	Destination Address SPI Algorithm KEY Authentication Algorithm Authentication Key

UDP packet toward closed port

	-	-
IPv6	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
UDP	Source Port	Any unused port on HOST1
	Destination Port	Any closed port on NUT

ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable with ESP3

IPv6	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout3
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out3
ICMPv6	Туре	1 (Destination Unreachable)
	Code	4 (Port unreachable)



(passive node) HOST1_Link1 NUT_Link0 (TN) (NUT) | ------ ciphertext ----->| *ICMPv6 Echo Request with ESP1* |<----- ciphertext -----| *ICMPv6 Echo Reply with ESP2* | (Judgment #1) | ------ plaintext ----->| *UDP packet toward closed port* |<----- ciphertext -----| *ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable with ESP3* | (Judgment #2) | V V

Part A (ADVANCED):

- 1. HOST1_Link1 sends "ICMPv6 Echo Request with ESP1" to NUT_Link0
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0
- 3. HOST1_Link1 sends "UDP packet toward closed port" to NUT_Link0
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT_Link0 transmits "ICMPv6 Echo Reply with ESP2"

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT_Link0 transmits "ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable with ESP3"

Possible Problems:




1.2. invoking Neighbor Unreachability Detection

Requirements:

> Must respond to ICMPv6 Echo Request with ICMPv6 Echo Reply

Initialization:

Use following topology



Reboot NUT making sure it has cleared its neighbor cache. Allow time for all devices on Link0 to perform Stateless Address Autoconfiguration and Duplicate Address Detection.

250



- 1. Set the global address (NUT_Link0) to NUT by RA if NUT is the host. Otherwise set the global address (NUT_Link0) to NUT manually
- 2. Set MTU (1500 bytes for Link0) to NUT by RA if NUT is the host. Otherwise set MTU (1500 bytes for Link0) to NUT manually.
- 3. Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

(p HOST1 transport	assive no NUT	de)	
spi=0x1000 < spi=0x2000 < spi=0x3000 spi=0x4000	– SA2–0 – SA3–0	ICMP∨6 ICMP∨6	Echo Reply



• SA1-I

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request
direction	inbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

• SA2-O

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link0
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD)

<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>	
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	outbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



• SA3-O

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link0
SPI	0x3000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout3
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out3

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	NUT_Link0	
destination address	HOST1_Link0	
upper spec	ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation	
direction	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01outbound	
protocol	ESP	
mode	transport	

• SA4-I

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x4000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin04
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in04

Security Policy Database (SPD)

=	-
source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement
direction	inbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation (multicast)

IPv6	Hop Limit	255
	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
		(solicited-node multicast address)
ICMPv6	Туре	135 (Neighbor Solicitation)
	Target Address NUT_Link0	
	Source link-layer address Option	
	Link-Layer Address: HOST1_Link0 MAC address	

ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement

	-		
IPv6	Hop Limit	255	
	Source Address	NUT_Link0	
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0	
ICMPv6	Туре	136 (Neighbor Advertisement)	
	R	false (if NUT is the host)	
		true (if NUT is the router)	
	S	true	
	0	true	
	Target Address	NUT_Link0	
	Target link-layer address Option		
	Link-Layer Address: NUT_Link0 MAC address		

ICMPv6 Echo Request with ESP1

IPv6	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMPv6	Туре	128 (Echo Request)

ICMPv6 Echo Reply with ESP2

		/
IPv6	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
ICMPv6	Туре	129 (Echo Reply)




	e	
IPv6	Hop Limit	255
	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout3
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out3
ICMPv6	Туре	135 (Neighbor Solicitation)
	Target Address	HOST1_Link0
	Source link-layer address Option	
	Link-Layer Address: NUT_Link0 MAC address	

ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation with ESP3

ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement with ESP4

IPv6	Hop Limit	255
	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin04
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in04
ICMPv6	Туре	136 (Neighbor Advertisement)
	R	false
	S	true
	0	true
	Target Address	HOST1_Link0
	Target link-layer address Option	
	Link-Layer Address: HOST1_Link0 MAC addr	







Part A (ADVANCED):

- HOST1_Link0 sends "ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation (multicast)" to NUT_Link0
- 2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0
- 3. HOST1_Link0 sends "ICMPv6 Echo Request with ESP1" to NUT_Link0
- 4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0
- Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0 for DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME (5) seconds
- HOST1_Link0 sends "ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement with ESP4" to NUT_Link0

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):
 NUT_Link0 transmits "ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement"
Step-4 (Judgment #2):
 NUT_Link0 transmits "ICMPv6 Echo Reply with ESP2"
Step-5 (Judgment #3):
 NUT_Link0 transmits "ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation with ESP3"

Possible Problems:



All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) 2004 Yokogawa Electric Corporation

IPv6 Forum

No part of this documentation may be reproduced for any purpose without prior permission.